

Supplementary submission:

The one thing lacking in relation to the airport scanners issue is a risk management assessment in keeping with Australian Government policy.

Since the tabling of CLA and other submissions to the Senate inquiry, we have had the opportunity to critically review the information being presented to the Committee. There is one obvious – but basic – consideration that we hoped other, technical experts would raise. In the absence of any such contribution, we provide a supplementary submission which covers this vital ground.

Most submissions raise useful and relevant points (e.g. health implications, virtual strip search) but security risk management considerations are conspicuous by their absence. Any justification of the full body scanners with reference to the actual assessed threat sources, risk environment, and the likelihood of an attack is also completely absent from the various assertions made by the government when attempting to justify this additional intrusive and ineffective security countermeasure.

The security policy of the Australian Government is that security measures must – not might – be based on security risk analysis of the likelihood and consequences of expected adverse events, and that the process defined in the globally-accepted ISO31000 risk management standard must be followed. The government's own mandated security approach seems to have been ignored in developing this airport scanning proposal. (We assume that this is because the government policy appears to address the political risk of being called 'soft on terror', not the actual security risk).

The proposers of mandatory full body scanning fail to:


- 1) Demonstrate the existence of a realistic threat. In fact the absence of any security risk events (breaches, incidents) at airports attributable to the seemingly ubiquitous "terrorists" in, say, the past 10 years tends to indicate the threat is rare to non-existent; and
- 2) Demonstrate that the full body scanning is or will be an effective security countermeasure against the perceived threat.

The proposal falls into the usual logical trap and fallacy committed by people without a professional background in or understanding of security risk analysis. They have defined the security countermeasure without first identifying, through objective analysis, the most likely risk events it is intended to mitigate. It is the responsibility of those who propose security countermeasures to prove that the expected threat exists

or is reasonably expected, and that the countermeasure will mitigate the consequences if an incident occurs.

Deciding to waste more public funds on an unproven, intrusive security countermeasure, such as the body scanners, without supporting this with security risk analysis is plainly inconsistent with professionally-accepted approaches to protective security. It directly contradicts Australian Government security policy.

Such a logically deficient approach occurs repeatedly in Australia with anti-terrorism issues. Here is a diagram from ISO31000 of the process which must be followed. If the Australian Government responds that its citizens cannot be trusted with knowing what the government has relied upon in deciding on specific countermeasures, we stress the importance of “Communication and Consultation” as highlighted in the diagram. We also highlight the illogicality of a government not keeping its people as fully educated and informed as possible about security matters.



– diagram from ISO31000

Please note that the government has circumvented the ISO31000 process by going straight to the ‘risk treatment’ stage without first analysing if a realistic threat exists – they appear to have assumed that adversaries (i.e. terrorists) have the intent, capability and motivation to attack airports/aircraft in/from Australia using the particular vector of weapons/explosives on passengers.

This does not seem to be borne out by the facts available: CLA believes we can be certain that if such security measures as proposed had actually prevented an attack or

incident, the Australian and other (US, UK, etc) agencies involved would be loudly and widely highlighting their success. Such successes are not in fact occurring, meaning the countermeasures are misdirected.

The government's uneducated and unscientific approach also relies upon correctly guessing the attack vector and plot at the tactical level, which will never work because adversaries will just adopt another tactic.

The politics of fear also relies upon exaggerating the capabilities of terrorists, For example, in 2008 about 40% of polled Americans believed that a nuclear attack by terrorists would occur before 2013...but terrorists do not currently have that technical capacity. The statements by senior Australian politicians and officials at a recent nuclear arms control meeting in Korea – even though Australia has no nuclear weapons – were embarrassing in their naivety.

As a well-known and respected “security theatre” commentator, Bruce Schneier, lucidly states, intelligence, investigation and emergency response are much better countermeasures than the latest ineffective, costly and intrusive technology.

There is no magic bullet, scanner-based or otherwise. The number of potential terrorist targets is infinite, but the probability that any one site/aircraft will be attacked is infinitesimally small.

Defining security countermeasures without first objectively analysing the threat sources and risk environment is akin to asking a doctor to prescribe treatment without first diagnosing the illness. A multitude of treatments may be available...but only a few may effectively treat the actual condition causing the perceived problem.

The Committee should call for the government to provide it with a proper risk assessment, to international standards, before proceeding with the inquiry. CLA believes such an assessment will not produce the recommendation for scanners as proposed, and that therefore the matter will become moot.

CLA Civil Liberties Australia
Box 7438 Fisher ACT Australia
Email: [secretary \[at\] cla.asn.au](mailto:secretary[at]cla.asn.au)
Web: www.cla.asn.au